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Mechanism Design and Auctions for Electricity
Network
Benjamin Heymann and Alejandro Jofre´
Abstract We present some key aspects of wholesale electricity markets modeling
and more specifically focus our attention on auctions and mechanism design. Some
of the results arising from those models are the computation of an optimal alloca-
tion for the Independent System Operator, the study of the equilibria (existence and
unicity in particular) and the design of mechanisms to increase the social surplus.
From a more general perspective, this field of research provides clues to discuss
how wholesale electricity market should be regulated. We start with a general intro-
duction and then present some results the authors obtained recently. We also briefly
expose some undergoing related work. As an illustrative example, a section is de-
voted to the computation of the Independent System Operator response function for
a symmetric binodal setting with piece-wise linear production cost functions.
1 Introduction
Economists, engineers and mathematicians have been giving a lot of attention to
electricity markets since the beginning of the liberalization era in the eighties. We
present recent results and ongoing research about wholesale electricity markets
in mandatory pool settings and, in particular, the optimal design of such market.
Market design studies the effects of market rules on economic functioning such
as oligopoly behavior, vertical integration, market power, pricing, externalities and
so on. The number of recent Nobel Prize laureates with contributions in this field
demonstrates its impact on the economic thinking. In this chapter we focus on recent
works [1], [2], [3] and [4] as well as on some ongoing research by the authors.
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In what follows, we assume that we are in a mandatory pool market, i.e. the agents
will satisfy their engagements.
The specificity of a market in term of economical, industrial and geographical
setting, its dependency on the regulatory environment, the entities that compose it
- producers, consumers, Independent System Operator (ISO) and network - and the
time scales, and the complex physical properties of electrical networks (Kirchhoff
laws for instance) explain the diversity in electrical market models.
Key modeling decisions concern the agents preferences, the uncertainties on the
energy sources and demands, the information representation, the production capac-
ities and the physics of the system. In particular one have to specify the structure
used to represent the bidding strategies of the producers. Since the physics of an
electrical network is a hard problem too, it is usually simplified.
The classic questions arising from any modeling attempt are the mathematical
well posedness of the problem, the existence, the uniqueness and the tractability of
the equilibria as well as their properties. Besides, one may ask about the existence
of efficient algorithms for calculating those equilibria. We point out that models
for wholesale electricity markets are often general enough to be relevant for other
economical settings.
In our setting, the production allocation plan is the result of an auction. Indeed,
the producers communicate their selling prices to a central agent, and then the cen-
tral agent minimizes the total cost while satisfying the demand. In what follows we
most of the time take into account the geography of the network (i.e. production
and consumption are not co-localized at one point) as well as the losses due to the
electricity transportation. Figure 1 presents a simple example of network with four
nodes.
We first present the general setting of the model in Section 2. Section 3 is a short
review of some recent related works in the field. We give a quantitative formulation
of the problem in Section 4. We will discuss the main results in Sections 5. In Sec-
tion 6 we develop the example of a two producers setting with piece-wise linear cost
functions. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Setting
This section is a qualitative description of the market settings encountered in the
literature. We try to be as general as possible, whereas in Section 3 we focus on the
frameworks Escobar, Figueroa, Heymann and Jofre´ study in [1], [2], [3] and [4].
The main market model components are the agents, the demand, the network, the
regulation and the structure of information (since some uncertainty is usually part of
the model). Besides, different types of equilibria could be considered. An example
of network is proposed in Figure 1.
The agents are divided among those who produce electricity (producers) and
those who consume it (usually aggregated into an ISO). In our setting, both pro-
ducers and consumer are macroscopic, but for the sack of completeness, we note
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Fig. 1 An example of a wholesale electricity market network. On the demand side, at each node ai
there is a demand (load) di that has to be fulfilled. On the supply side, electricity can be produced at
some nodes by some independent agents. The production cost function associates the quantity pro-
duced by an agent and the corresponding economical cost (it is specific to the agent). For modeling
but also technical and practical reasons, those production cost functions are often approximated
with functions in simple functional sets (linear, quadratic, piecewise linear...). Electricity can be
sent from one node to another through the edges of the network, but there is a price for that (for
instance, a loss proportional to the square of the quantity sent). The Independent System Operator
(ISO) is as its name indicates a central operator that has to allocate the production so that supply
meet demand while minimizing a criteria (usually the total price). To produce this allocation, the
ISO needs to know the price he will have to pay for each allocation, so the producers specify a bid
function that is usually in the same simple aforementioned functional set. Since the ISO has no
way to know the real production cost function of the producers, it is in their interest to game the
system. We point out that stochasticity may occurs on the demand. Moreover, the network aspect
of the market is of primary importance, as it is responsible for the market power of the agent.
a1
a2
a3
a4
r1,2
r2,3
r1,4
r2,4 r3,4
that some models use a continuum of microscopic producers. The microscopic pro-
ducers models correspond to situations where no producer can have any unilateral
impact on the market.
Producers incur production costs when they supply electricity to the market. This
cost depends on the quantity of electricity they produce individually. This relation
between the quantity the producer supply and its production cost is encoded in his
production cost function. To sell electricity, producers quote a price to the market.
We consider later in the chapter two structures to model the way a producer spec-
ifies a selling price: the bid function and the supply function. A bid function maps
any quantity of electricity to the price a producer asks to supply such quantity. A
supply function maps any price to the quantity a producer is ready to supply at such
price. The objective of each producer is to maximize his individual profit (or his av-
erage profit if the model contains any form of randomness). We consider only non
cooperative settings: producers are competing against each other.
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We assume dispatch decisions to be centralized: a unique agent, the Independent
System Operator (ISO), aggregates the demand side. We justify this aggregation
by the regulatory environment and the market organization. The ISO receives bids
from producers and has to supply the local electricity demand where it is needed by
buying the electricity at the quoted prices (pay as bid market) The demand is most
of the time (i.e. in the literature we are considering) inelastic, but it could be either
deterministic or stochastic.
Usually electricity is seen as a divisible commodity. Nonetheless in our model we
can also see it as a geographically differentiated product. Indeed, unless production
facilities and consumers are colocalized, productions and demands are dispatched
on a network. The network contains nodes and edges. Each node is a place where
electricity is produced or consumed (or both) and so is characterized by its local
demand and its local producers. Each edge is a place through which electricity can
be sent. The ISO has the possibility to send any nodal electricity surplus where
it is needed through the network cables but those cables are subject to physical
limitations such as capacity constraints and online losses (due to Joule effects). The
geographical differentiation comes from the fact that it the ISO who incurs those
losses.
We envision different kinds of optimization problems: the standard ISO prob-
lem, the agents profit maximization problem and the mechanism design problem.
The first one, and the simplest, simply consists in finding the minimal cost produc-
tion plan. For this problem the ISO, (or principal, if we want to use the mechanism
design terminology) receives bids from the different producers and knows the de-
mand (deterministic or stochastic) at each node. He then has to supply this demand
at each node for the cheapest total cost. This optimization is subject to the network
physical limitations and is parametrized by the demand at each nodes and the pro-
ducers bids. We call principal response the function that maps these parameters with
the solution of the corresponding problem.
The second problem comes from the agents perspective. Knowing the principal
response function, their own production costs functions and some common knowl-
edge on their fellow producers, they optimize their bids to maximize their individual
profits. This problem raises questions about best response strategies and Nash equi-
libria.
In mechanism design, there is an agent and a principal. In our model, we assign
the role of the principal to the ISO. The mechanism design problem reverts the role
of the principal and the agents: the principal builds his response function knowing
that the agents will then maximize their profits. By offering the right incentives, he
leads the agents. The mechanism design problem can be formulated by considering
that the principal gives a new response function that is not the optimal solution of
the first problem. Indeed, instead of waiting for the bids to order the production, the
ISO defines in a contract a response function that he will respect in the future. This
contract depends on the (future) bids of each producer and the demand at each node.
Why would he do such a thing ? Because otherwise there are no incentives for the
agents to tell the truth about their true production costs, so when they bid a price,
they just selfishly optimize their own benefits based on the information they have.
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We have shown that in some very general setting, it is possible for the principal to
formulate the response function in the contract so that the producers are incentivized
to reveal their true types (i.e. real production costs). Put differently, the principal can
design a contract so that for each producer, it is optimal to reveal his true production
costs function. To do so, the principal has to pay (virtually, through the payment
function define in the contract) an information rent to the producers, but his total
cost is smaller than in the previous setting.
In general the principal does not know the real production cost of the producers.
This is why producers can bid higher than their production cost. The information
the principal has about the producers costs is modeled by a probability distribution.
The less the producer knows about the production costs, the higher the information
rent.
3 Literature
Several approaches have been proposed to answer the questions raised in the previ-
ous Section. In [6] Klemperer and Meyer show that uncertainty reduces the quan-
tity of supply function Nash equilibria. The firms bid their supply functions before
demand is revealed. The existence of a Nash equilibria is shown for a symmetric
oligopoly. In [7], Anderson and Philpott show how to construct optimal time de-
pendent supply functions in electricity market setting where demand and competing
generators behaviors are unknown by introducing a market distribution function.
The gaming aspect of the situation is reduced by arguing that competitors do not re-
act to the producer bids. The problem is formulated as an optimal control problem.
In [8] the authors study asymmetric competition and propose a numerical solver
based on GAMS to compute the optimal strategies. They compare the algorithm
with the ODE method. In [9], Anderson gives a proof of existence of a pure Nash
Equilibria under some technical assumptions when the network is reduced to a sin-
gle point. He also gives sufficient conditions for unicity. Optimal auction design
was introduced by Myerson in his 1981 seminal article [12]. Laffont and Martimort
wrote in [5] an introduction to mechanism design in a general setting. The authors
expose important concepts such as the revelation principle, adverse selection, par-
ticipation constraints and information rent. The book does not consider interactions
on a network -which is the specificity of the wholesale electricity market. Bi-level
approaches with quadratic production cost functions are proposed in [10] and [11]
to study the ISO response functions and the Nash equilibria.
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4 Quantitative formulations
We briefly present in this section some questions of interest concerning models that
fit into the general setting described in Section 2. Those questions were partially
addressed in recent works by the authors.
4.1 Generality
We will generically use the notations i to refer to a producer and qi to refer to the
quantity this agent produces. The nodes are connected by edges and we denote by
hi,i′ the quantity of electricity that is sent from node i to node i′. The market network
is not necessary complete. We call di the demand at node i. Each producer quotes
a bid denoted by bi to the principal. This bid is a function of the quantity qi. Each
producer also informs the principal of the maximum quantity q¯i he can produce. In
general, the allocation problem is subject to network constraints, i.e., the vector h
of components hi,i′ has to be in a set H. For example the set H could be made of all
vector h such that hi,i′ ≤ hmaxi,i′ , which means that one cannot send an arbitrary big
amount of electricity thought the network.
4.2 The standard allocation problem
The principal receives bids from the agents and allocates the production so that:
• the allocation minimizes the total cost;
• the allocation respects the network and capacity constraints;
• supply is greater than demand at any node.
The last point corresponds to the nodal constraints. The supply at a given node i
is the sum of the local production qi and the importations from neighboring nodes
∑i′ hi′,i. To this we need to subtract the exportations to neighboring nodes ∑i′ hi,i′
and the line losses. If we send a quantity h through an edge {i, i′}, we denote by
Li,i′(h) the corresponding loss. To get a symmetric expression we will count half of
this loss at node i and the other half at node i′. We end up with the following nodal
constraint:
qi+∑
i′
hi′,i−hi,i′ −∑
i′
Li′,i(hi′,i)+Li,i′(hi,i′)
2
≥ di, (1)
where the summations are performed over the nodes adjacent to i. All this being
said, the generic allocation problem writes
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minimize
q,h
∑
i
bi(qi)
subject to qi+∑
i′
hi′,i−hi,i′ −∑
i
Li,i′(hi′,i)+Li,i′(hi,i′)
2
≥ di
qi ≤ q¯i
h ∈ H
hi, j ≥ 0.
(2)
We point out that if the bidding and the loss functions are convex functions and H
is a convex set, then the problem is convex. For instance, one can take the bid func-
tions linear, the loss functions quadratic and H is R+. Note that the bid functions bi
and the demand vector d can be seen as parameters of the optimization problem. We
could make the solution of this problem stochastic by adding a dependency of d to a
random event ω . This would not change the solution of the problem from the oper-
ator perspective, but it would change the market setting for the agents. What is the
solution of this problem? What are the analytical properties of this solution?
How can we compute it?
4.3 The agent problem
The objective of each producer is to maximize his profit. Note that by solving the
principal allocation problem, we have the response function of the ISO to the agents
bids. It is stochastic if the demand is stochastic. We can map each bidding profile
of the agents with the expected profit of each agent. So by competing against each
other, the agents are playing a game. In addition, producer i does not know the
production cost functions of his fellow agents. So we are in an imperfect information
setting. We assume that for each agent i there is a probability distribution fi over the
production functions that represents the information the other agents have about
agent i. We assume those probability distributions to be independent. The profit of
an agent of type (i.e. production cost function) ci that bids bi is given by
pii(c,x) =
∫
C−i
[bi(qi(bi,b(c−i))− c(qi(bi,b(c−i)))] f−i(c−i)dc−i, (3)
where the integral is performed over the types of the other agents. Then the maxi-
mized profit is
pi i(c) = max
bi
∫
C−i
[(bi(qi(bi,b(c−i))− c(qi(bi,b(c−i))] f−i(c−i)dc−i (4)
and an optimal strategy b¯i(c) must satisfy:
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b¯i(c) ∈ argmax
bi
∫
C−i
[(bi(qi(bi,b(c−i))− c(qi(bi,b(c−i))] f−i(c−i)dc−i. (5)
So for each agent the best response strategy to the other agents is the solution of an
optimization problem on the set of maps from the types (i.e. production cost func-
tions) c to the bids b. Usually, the production cost functions will be characterized by
a vector of Rn. In this case this is an optimization over the functions from Rn to Rn.
Of course, it is natural to ask about the Nash Equilibria of the game. We point out
that when r = 0, and there are no network and capacity constraints (and of course,
the network is connected), the problem corresponds to the classic setting of first
best auction theory (see Figure 2). What can we say about this game? Is there an
equilibrium ? Is it unique ? Can the agents ‘game‘ the system ?
4.4 The optimal mechanism design problem
In this part we assume everybody knows the demand. In order to decrease the market
power of the agents and increase social welfare, we reverse the role of the principal
and the agents, i.e. the principal “bids” a contract to the agent. The contract should
associate each bid profile (bi)i with two vectors q and x, where qi is the quantity
of electricity agent i has to produce and xi is amount of money he will receive. Of
course, this contract has to be incentive compatible, i.e. the payments described by
the principal need to be high enough to make the agent willing to stay in the market.
In this situation, the problem we are solving is the design of the optimal contract:
minimize
q j ,hi,k,x j
∑
j
Ex j(c)
subject to q j(c)+∑
i
hi, j−h j,i−∑
i
Li, j(hi, j)+L j,i(h j,i)
2
≥ d j
Ex j(c)−C j(q j(c),c)≥ Ex j(b)−C j(q j(b),c)
Ex j(c)−C j(q j(c),c))≥ 0
hi, j,x j ≥ 0,
(6)
where E denotes the mean operator with respect to the fi’s, c denote the vector of
production cost functions and the constraints should be verified for all c. We refer
to [4] for a justification of the formulation. We point out that this is an optimization
problem over a functional set (so infinite dimensional) with an infinite number of
constraints. We display some results in Figures 3 and 4. How do we build such
problem? How can we solve it? How better is the social surplus with an optimal
design?
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4.5 A differential equation
We introduce a fictitious play like game for the binodal symmetric setting:
• 2 agents;
• Li,i′(hi,i′) = rhi,i′ ;
• H = R2+;
• q¯i =+∞;
• the cost functions and the bid functions are linear;
• d1 = d2: the demand is equal at each node.
• f1 = f2 = f
We look for a symmetric equilibrium. If the agents iteratively change their bid func-
tions proportionally to the corresponding increase in profit this will produce, the bid
functions dynamics should be described by this formal differential equation.
∂tb(c, t) = ∂bpib(c,b(c, t))) (7)
with
pib(c,s) =
∫
C−i
(s− c)(qi(s,b(c−i)) f (c−i)dc−i. (8)
Is this dynamics well posed? What conclusions can we draw from its study?
Can we build such dynamics for more general settings?
5 Important results
Escobar and Jofre´ show in [3] that in a random environment a Walrasian and a
non-cooperative equilibria exist (for the non-cooperative equilibrium the distribu-
tion need to be atom-less) in this setting, the demand is elastic and the ISO maximize
the sum of the utility functions. Utility functions and cost functions are general. Es-
cobar and Jofre´ demonstrate in [1], the existence of non-cooperative and Walrasian
equilibrium when the ISO solve the standard ISO problem and demand is uncertain.
The paper finishes with a welfare theorem for wholesale electricity auction. Escobar
and Jofre´ give in [2] a lower bound on the market power exercised by each produc-
ers. The existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is given.The authors also
give some regularity property on the ISO response function (condition to be a single-
ton, continuity and Lipschitzianity). The cost functions are general. Figueroa, Jofre´
and Heymann study in [4], a bi-nodal symmetric market with linear production cost
functions and quadratic losses (as shown in Figure 2). The principal minimal cost
production plan problem was already solved in [2] and an explicit solution given. If
we define
F(x,y) = d+
1
2r
(
x− y
x+ y
)2
− 1
r
(
x− y
x+ y
)
and q = 2
[
1−√1−2dr
r
]
(9)
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the solution to this problem can be written as
qi(ci,c−i) =
F(ci,c−i) if F(ci,c−i)≥ 0 and F(c−i,ci)≥ 0q if F(c−i,ci)< 0 and F(ci,c−i)≥ 00 if F(ci,c−i)< 0 and F(c−i,ci)≥ 0 (10)
This solution is used to compute an explicit solution of the mechanism design prob-
lem. The mechanism design solution is then compared to the standard setting for
which numerical simulations are performed. The authors assume that the function
Ji : ci −→ ci + Fi(ci)fi(ci) is increasing in ci, where fi is the distribution of the marginal
cost of producer i and Fi is its integral. Then the main result is
Proposition 1. Define
q˜ = 2
[
1−√1−2dr
r
]
Then an optimal mechanism is given by
qˆi(c) =

F(Ji(ci),J−i(c−i)) if F(Ji(ci),J−i(c−i))≥ 0
and F(J−i(c−i),Ji(ci))≥ 0
0 if F(Ji(ci),J−i(c−i))≤ 0
q˜ if F(J−i(c−i),Ji(ci))≤ 0
hˆi(c) =

1
r
[
J−i(c−i)−Ji(ci)
J−i(c−i)+Ji(ci)
]
if Ji(ci)≤ J−i(c−i) and F(J−i(c−i),Ji(ci))≥ 0
q˜−1 if Ji(ci)≤ J−i(c−i) and F(J−i(c−i),Ji(ci))≤ 0
0 if not
xˆi(c) = ciqˆi(c)+
ci∫
ci
qi(s,c−i)ds
We point out that the mechanism design is built with the standard ISO response
function, we just replace ci by Ji(ci).
6 Example: computing the ISO response function for a
symmetric binodal setting with piecewise linear production
cost functions
6.1 Introduction
In this section we derive an explicit expression for a specific example of ISO allo-
cation problem. We study the bi-nodal market with quadratic externalities displayed
in Figure 2. The production cost functions of both agents are made of two linear
pieces, with a slope change when the production level is equal to q¯. We denote by c1
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(resp. c2) producer 1 (resp. 2) marginal cost when his production level is below q¯,
and by c¯1 (resp. c¯2) when it is above. The production cost functions are convex i.e.
ci < c¯i and the demand d is the same at both nodes. We end-up with the following
formulation for the ISO allocation problem:
minimize
qi,q¯i,h
c1q1+ c¯1q¯1+ c2q2+ c¯2q¯2
subject to qi+ q¯i+(−1)ih≥ r2 (h
2)+d (λi) for i = 1,2
qi, q¯i ≥ 0 (µi) for i = 1,2
qi ≤ q¯ (γi) for i = 1,2.
(11)
In this formulation, qi is the quantity produced by agent i at marginal cost ci, and
q¯i is the quantity produced by i at marginal cost c¯i. These quantities are subject to
positivity constraints with multipliers µi and µ¯i. We also introduce λi the multipliers
of the nodal constraints, and γi the multipliers of the constraints qi ≤ q¯. We denote
F(λ1,λ2) = d+
1
r
λ2−λ1
λ1+λ2
+
1
2r
(
λ2−λ1
λ1+λ2
)2
, (12)
P(h) = h+
rh2
2
+d, (13)
k(λ1,λ2) = P
(
λ2−λ1
r(λ1+λ2)
)
, (14)
and
qtoti = qi+ q¯i. (15)
We assume without loss of generality that q¯ < 2d and c1 < c2. It is clear that if
q1 < q¯, then q¯1 = 0. To solve this problem, we check whether d < q¯ or d ≥ q¯.
6.2 If d < q¯
By hypothesis c1 < c2. This implies that q1 ≥ q2. So q¯2 > 0 implies that q1 = q2 =
q¯ > d, which is not optimal. Therefore we can set q¯2 = 0. We can also relax the
constraint q2 < q¯ because it won’t be binding for the optimal solution. So we rewrite
the problem
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minimize
qi,q¯1,h
c1q1+ c¯1q¯1+ c2q2
subject to
q1+ q¯1−h≥ r2 (h
2)+d (λ1)
q2+h≥ r2 (h
2)+d (λ2)
q1,q2, q¯1 ≥ 0 (µi)
q1 ≤ q˜ (γ1)
The first order conditions give
c1−λ1−µ1+ γ1 = 0 (16)
c2−λ2−µ2 = 0 (17)
c¯1−λ1− µ¯1 = 0 (18)
h =
λ2−λ1
r(λ1+λ2)
(19)
There are four possible cases.
6.2.1 Case 1: P( c2−c1r(c1+c2) )≤ q¯
We consider a relaxation of the problem by removing the constraint q1 ≤ q¯. In this
relaxed problem, any optimal solution should verify q¯1 = 0 so the relaxed problem is
equivalent to the linear cost functions allocation problem with costs ci, for which we
have an explicit formula of the solution. We then notice that the optimal solution
of the relaxed problem is admissible, so it is also the solution of (11).
6.2.2 Case 2: P( c2−c1r(c1+c2) )> q¯ and P(
c2−c¯1
r(c¯1+c2)
)≤ q¯
We show that q¯1 = 0 and q1 = q¯.
If q¯1 > 0, then by complementarity of the multiplier µ¯1 = 0, so with (18) λ1 = c¯1.
So by (19) we have h= λ2−c¯1r(c¯1+λ2) . Then by hypothesis and the fact that P is increasing
and λ2 ≤ c2 we have that P(h)≤ P( c2−c¯1r(c¯1+c2) )≤ q¯ . So q1+ q¯1 = q
tot ≤ q¯. Then using
the fact that q1 < q¯⇒ q¯1 = 0, we deduce that q¯1 is null, which is not the hypothesis.
We conclude that q¯1 = 0.
By hypothesis, q¯< 2d and less than q¯ is produced at node 1. Summing the two nodal
constraints we see that q2 > 0, so that λ2 = c2.
Now if q1 < q¯, then by complementarity of the multiplier γ1 = 0, then with (16)
c1 = λ1 and with (19), h = c2−c1r(c1+c2) . Therefore we get q1 + q¯1 = q
tot
1 ≥ P( c2−c1r(c1+c2) )
(by the first nodal constraint), so by hypothesis qtot1 ≥ q¯ and so q¯1 which we know
as false. So q1 = q¯.
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6.2.3 Case 3: P( c2−c1r(c1+c2) )> q¯ and P(
c2−c¯1
r(c¯1+c2)
)> q¯ and P( c¯1−c2r(c¯1+c2) )> 0
We show that q2 > 0, q1 = q¯, q¯1 > 0, and, q2 = P( c¯1−c2r(c¯1+c2) ).
First we show that q2 > 0. If q2 = 0, then by the second nodal constraint h≥ rh22 +d,
which means that P(−h)≤ 0. Moreover, q¯1 > 0 because 2d > q¯. So by (18) λ1 = c¯1.
With (17) and (19) we have P( c¯1−c2r(c¯1+c2) )≤ P(
c¯1−λ2
r(c¯1+λ2)
) = P(−h)≤ 0, which is false
by hypothesis. So q2 > 0. We deduce from this and (17) that λ2 = c2.
If q1 < q¯ then by complementarity of the multiplier γ1 = 0, so by (16), λ1 = c1 and
by (19), h = c2−c1r(c1+c2) . Then we get q
tot
1 ≥ P( c2−c1r(c1+c2) ) (by the first nodal constraint),
so by hypothesis qtot1 ≥ q¯, which implies q1 = q¯, which is absurd since we assumed
q1 < q¯. So q1 = q¯.
If q¯1 = 0 then with (18), λ1 ≤ c¯1 and so with (19), h ≥ c2−c¯1r(c¯1+c2) . We then deduce
by nodal constraint 1 and the hypothesis that qtot1 ≥ P(h) ≥ q¯, which implies that
q¯1 > 0, which is absurd. So q¯ > 0.
We know that q¯2 = 0. Using the second nodal constraint, we get q2 = P(
c¯1−c2
r(c¯1+c2)
).
With the first nodal constraint, we have q¯1 = P(
c2−c¯1
r(c¯1+c2)
)− q¯.
6.2.4 Case 4: P( c2−c1r(c1+c2) )> q¯ and P(
c2−c¯1
r(c¯1+c2)
)> q¯ and P( c¯1−c2r(c¯1+c2) )≤ 0
We show that q2 = 0.
Indeed, if q2 > 0, then λ2 = c2. Using the same reasoning as the one used in the
third case, we would show that q1 = q¯ and q¯1 > 0. So that h = − c¯1−c2r(c¯1+c2) . So using
P( c¯1−c2r(c¯1+c2) )≤ 0, we see that nodal constraint 2 is satisfied with q2 = 0, so the solution
is not optimal, which is absurd. So q2 = 0.
6.2.5 We conclude
Theorem 1. Assuming d < q¯ < 2d, then:
qtot1 = k(c1,c2) and q
tot
2 = k(c2,c1) if k(c1,c2)≤ q¯
qtot1 = q¯ and q
tot
2 = q¯−2
−1+√1+2r(q¯−d)
r
if k(c1,c2)> q¯ and k(c¯1,c2)≤ q¯
qtot1 = k(c¯1,c2) and q
tot
2 = k(c2, c¯1) if k(c1,c2)> q¯,k(c¯1,c2)> q¯ and k(c2, c¯1)> 0
qtot1 = 2
1−√1−2dr
r
and qtot2 = 0 if k(c1,c2)> q¯, k(c¯1,c2)> q¯ and k(c2, c¯1)≤ 0
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6.3 case d ≥ q¯
Since we consider that c1 is smaller than c2, there are two possibilities. Either the c¯i
are all bigger than the ci, or c¯1 is smaller than c2.
6.3.1 If the c¯i are all bigger than the ci
In this case, we first show that q1 = q2 = q¯. The problem then writes
minimize
qi,q¯i,h
c¯1q¯1+ c¯2q¯2
subject to q¯1+−h≥ r2 (h
2)+d− q¯ (λ1)
q¯2+h≥ r2 (h
2)+d− q¯ (λ2)
q¯i ≥ 0 (µi) for i = 1,2
which corresponds to the linear case problem with a demand of d− q¯ and costs of
c¯i.
6.3.2 If c¯1 is smaller than c2
We point out that replacing c1 by c¯1 does not change the solution.
If F(c2, c¯1)≤ q¯, we show that q¯2 = 0 the problem can be reduced to the linear pro-
duction cost problem with demand d and marginal costs c¯1 and c2.
If F(c2, c¯1)> q¯, we show that we can reduce the linear production cost problem
with demand d−q and marginal costs c¯1 and c¯2.
Theorem 2. If d ≥ q¯, then
• If ci ≤ c¯ j for all i, j, then we get the result by solving the linear problem with
demand d− q¯ and costs c¯i and adding q¯ to the quantity we get.
• If 0 ≤ F(c2, c¯1) ≤ q¯ we reduce to the linear allocation problem with demand d
and marginal cost c¯1 and c2.
• If F(c2, c¯1) > q¯, we reduce the problem to the linear allocation problem with
demand d−q and marginal costs c¯1 and c¯2 and add q¯ to the qis we get.
7 On going work
We are currently working on generalization of those results. In particular, we have
shown that for a market with n-pieces piecewise linear production cost functions and
any number of producers, there is a mechanism design with an explicit formulation.
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a1 a2
r
Fig. 2 In [4] and [2], the authors consider a binodal market with quadratic line losses. The demand
is the same at both nodes. The production cost functions are linear. There are no network and
capacity constraints. A very intuitive justification of the market power induced by the line losses is
given in [2]. Indeed, in a symmetric perfect information setting with linear production cost function
of slope c, the equilibrium strategy of both producers is to bid c1−2dr > c.
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Fig. 3 The average total cost for the ISO (in the market described in Figure 2) as a function of the
loss coefficient r for the standard mechanism and the optimal mechanism. We take f1(c) = f2(c) =
2c+ (1− 24 )1c≤ 12 +−2c+ (1+
3
2 )1c≥ 12 . Note how r influences the social cost in the standard
mechanism. The agents market power increase with r. When r goes to zero, the two mechanisms
lead to the same social cost. When r = 0 we recover a classic result on first and second best
auctions.
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Fig. 4 Comparison of bidding strategy and information rent for the market described in Figure
2. The standard bid strategy corresponds to the equilibrium strategy of the Bayesian Game. The
Honesty strategy correspond to a producer telling the truth. The optimal cost correspond to the sum
of the truth-telling strategy and the information rent.
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